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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11347 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, 
LOCAL 71-71A, 
Respondent. 
SAMUEL F. HOUSTON, ESQ., Corporation Counsel (DAVID R. MIX, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
KENNETH D. ARMES, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The City of Buffalo (City) excepts to the portion of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) decision which finds a demand 
made by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 
71-71A (Engineers) to be a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 1/ 
At issue before us is a demand (Demand Number 3) 
submitted by the Engineers to a fact finder, which provides: 
i/The charge before the ALJ related to three demands made 
by the Engineers. The ALJ held two of the demands to be 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation and one to be a 
mandatory subject. Because no exceptions were filed to the 
portion of the ALJ decision holding two subjects to be 
nonmandatory, we make no finding with respect to them and 
our review is accordingly limited to the one which is the 
subject of the City's exceptions. 
Board - U-11347 
-2 
Employees shall receive a minimum of five 
day notice relative to shift or building 
assignment change. 
The City argues that the demand is not mandatorily 
negotiable because it does not provide for emergency 
situations in which five days advance notice of shift or 
building assignment changes cannot reasonably be made, and, 
therefore, the demand improperly impinges upon its 
prerogative to establish staffing levels on shifts and in 
buildings. The ALJ determined, however, based upon testimony 
and documentary evidence, that both parties specifically 
understood that emergency situations would constitute an 
exception to the five-day notice contained in the demand. 
The ALJ further concluded that the five-day notice 
requirement contained in the demand was not reasonably 
construed to absolutely and in all cases preclude a change in 
building assignment or shift without five days notice, 
pointing to evidence that the City negotiators understood the 
demand to mean that in cases in which five days advance 
notice was not given, changes could be made, but overtime 
compensation might be required. Based upon these findings, 
the ALJ determined that the notice requirement contained in 
the demand does not unreasonably impinge upon the City's 
ability to meet its staffing needs and that it is mandatorily 
negotiable. 
./ 
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In view of the parties' understanding of the meaning and 
effect of the demand, we affirm the ALJ's determination that the 
at-issue demand is a mandatory subject of negotiations. In this 
regard, we distinguish our holding in City of Schenectady, 21 
PERB f3022 (1988), where a demand concerning assignments and 
maintenance of shift schedules was held to be nonmandatory 
because we were unable to determine from the mere language of the 
demand or parol evidence concerning its intent, that the demand 
would not interfere with the employer's right to determine 
staffing needs. Here, as found by the ALT, both parties 
understand that the demand is intended to apply in nonemergency 
situations, and that alternatives, such as the payment of 
overtime compensation, are still available to meet emergency 
staffing needs. Under these circumstances, the demand is 
mandatorily negotiable, and the City's charge of improper 
insistence by the Engineers upon its submission to factfinding 
should accordingly be dismissed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed insofar as it relates to the Engineers• Demand Number 3. 
DATED: October 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MembelJ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COPIAGUE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10329 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG, GROSS, RICHMOND, 
HEIDELBERGER & REICH, ESQS. (JOHN J. GROSS, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) and cross-
exceptions of the Copiague Union Free School District 
(District) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision 
which found that CSEA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, at a July 27, 1988 
CSEA ratification meeting, its chief negotiator failed to 
adequately recommend ratification of a memorandum of 
understanding reached between the parties, but which 
dismissed the charge in all other respects. 
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CSEA's exceptions assert that the ALJ's finding that the 
chief negotiator's disclosure of a two-to-two deadlock within 
the CSEA negotiating team at the ratification meeting 
constitutes a failure to recommend ratification is erroneous. 
It supports this claim by asserting that notwithstanding 
disclosure of the deadlock within the negotiating team, the 
chief negotiator and the then-president of the unit both 
affirmatively urged ratification, and that such support 
fulfilled CSEA's obligations under the Act. 
The District's cross-exceptions assert that the ALT 
erred in failing to find a violation of the Act in the 
silence of the remaining members of the CSEA negotiating team 
prior to and during the ratification meeting based upon the 
factual circumstances there present. The District's argument 
relies upon decisions of this Board which have held that the 
duty to negotiate in good faith includes a duty on the part 
of individual negotiating unit members to affirmatively 
support ratification. 
Certain facts, found by the ALT and not in dispute 
before us, are particularly relevant to our consideration of 
the exceptions and cross-exceptions in this matter. These 
facts are as follows. 
On July 25, 1988, following a lengthy negotiation 
session, representatives of the District and the entire CSEA 
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negotiating team then present-^/ entered into and executed a 
memorandum of agreement for a three-year term. The ALT 
further found that at the time of finalization and execution 
of the memorandum of agreement, no CSEA negotiating team 
member voiced any opposition to any portion of the agreement 
or reserved, either orally or in writing, the right to 
express opposition to any portion of the agreement, or 
indicated any intention not to support ratification. 
Thereafter, on July 27, 1988, both CSEA's chief 
negotiator, Patrick Curtin, and its then unit president, 
Howard Spielman, conducted a ratification meeting, at which 
the remaining members of the CSEA negotiating team were 
present. Curtin testified that at the outset of the 
ratification meeting he informed the membership that the 
negotiating team had been deadlocked, and amplified his 
statement as follows: 
Q. So you told the membership that - you 
explained - did you explain what you 
meant by "deadlocked"? 
A. That it was a two-to-two vote. 
Q. Two in favor and two opposed? 
A. I didn't identify who was or wasn't. 
Q. You said there was two opposed and 
two in favor; is that right? 
1/ One team member was not present at all during the session 
and a second team member, who was present during the 
negotiating session, had to leave for personal reasons prior 
to execution of the memorandum of agreement. 
/ 
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A. (witness nods.) 
Judge Comenzo: You have to answer. 
A. Yes. 
Curtin further testified that he urged ratification, 
advised the members present of the delay and other 
consequences of rejecting the agreement, and advised the 
members that the agreement compared favorably to other 
agreements being negotiated in the area. According to the 
testimony, Spielman also urged ratification of the agreement. 
None of the other members of the negotiating team made any 
statements prior to the ratification vote. A ratification 
vote, conducted by secret ballot, resulted in a 19 to 4 
rejection of the agreement. Thereafter, Curtin reviewed the 
memorandum of agreement with the members item by item, 
obtaining a vote concerning those specific issues rejected by 
the membership for purposes of further discussion with the 
District. 
The ALJ found that the disclosure by the chief 
negotiator of the even split between the members of the 
negotiating team concerning acceptance or rejection of the 
agreement established, at best, a neutral position on the 
part of the negotiating team, in contravention of its duty 
under the Act to affirmatively support ratification. We 
agree. An evenly divided vote represents, at the most, no 
position at all with respect to ratification and, as we have 
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previously held:-2/ 
[T]he failure of negotiators 
affirmatively to support an agreement is 
a violation of the Taylor Law unless the 
negotiators had advised the other party 
in advance that they would not give such 
support, [footnote: Wappingers CSD. 5 
PERB f3074 f1972); Union Springs CSD. 6 
PERB 53074 (1973); Harpursville CSD. 14 
PERB ^3003 (1980); and Jeffersonville-
Younasville CSD, 16 PERB 53106 (1983)] 
We accordingly find that the establishment, at the 
outset of the ratification meeting conducted by CSEA, of a 
neutral or "no position" position of its negotiating team 
violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act. 
We now turn to the District's cross-exceptions 
concerning the dismissal of so much of its charge as alleges 
a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Act based upon the failure 
of the negotiating team members individually to support 
ratification at the ratification meeting. 
CSEA witnesses testified, without contradiction, that 
the practice followed by CSEA at ratification meetings has 
consistently been to have the unit president, acting as the 
spokesperson for the negotiating team, present the agreement 
to the membership for ratification. As we have previously 
held-^ /, such a procedure, as a general proposition, 
establishes no violation of the Act. We have also held that 
^Town of Putnam Valley, 17 PERB 53041, at 3066 (1984). 
1/ld. 
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the member of a negotiating team who specifically advises the 
other party, in advance, that he or she will not support the 
agreement is relieved thereby of the statutory duty to 
affirmatively support ratification.-^/ However, neither of 
these principles applies to the facts of the instant case. 
The two team members opposed to the agreement failed to 
communicate their opposition or assert their right to be 
relieved of the duty to affirmatively support ratification at 
the time that the memorandum of agreement was executed. 
Furthermore, the silence of the team members in the face of 
the disclosure by the chief negotiator of the existence of a 
two-to-two vote by the negotiating team on the agreement 
constitutes, in essence, an admission of failure to support 
for ratification. Thus, while the unit president's call for 
ratification might normally be construed as affirmative 
support expressed on behalf of the entire negotiating team, 
such an inference could not reasonably be drawn from the team 
members' silence following the announcement of a "deadlock". 
Accordingly, we grant the cross-exceptions of the District 
and find that CSEA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act when its 
negotiating team failed to affirmatively support ratification 
of the memorandum of agreement executed on July 25, 1988. 
4/ld. 
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Notwithstanding the exceptions of CSEA, we affirm the 
ALJ decision with respect to the remedial relief recommended 
in view of our prior holdings that the appropriate remedy for 
violation of the Act in the conduct of ratification 
procedures, or in the failure to conduct proper ratification 
procedures, is the waiver of the right to ratify. 
5/ 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that CSEA execute, upon the 
request of the District, a collective bargaining agreement 
embodying the agreements reached by the parties on July 25, 
1988 and set forth in the parties' memorandum of 
understanding of that date. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that CSEA sign and post the 
attached notice at all locations used by it for written 
communications to District employees within the bargaining 
unit represented by CSEA. 
DATED: October 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
'~%2k4l-&f/& A/Ltrtu 4^1 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member* 
Vsee Jamesville-Dewitt CSD, 22 PERB 53048, at 3112 
(189); City of Saratoga Springs, 20 PERB f3031 (1987) ; and 





THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
y n ry
 a l l employees of the Copiague Union Free School 
District in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. that the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc. will execute, upon the request of the District, a collective 
bargaining agreement embodying the agreement reached by the parties 
on July 25, 1988 and set forth in the parties' memorandum of 
understanding of that date. 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered. 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2010/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIDDLE COUNTRY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
CHIEF & HEAD SUPERVISORY UNIT OF SUFFOLK 
EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 870, CSEA, LOCAL 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10296 
MIDDLE COUNTRY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (MIGUEL ORTIZ, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (ERNEST R. STOLZER, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Middle 
Country Central School District Chief & Head Supervisory Unit 
of Suffolk Educational Local 870, CSEA, Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA) and the cross-exceptions of the Middle Country 
Central School District (District) to an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) decision finding that the District violated 
§2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when, in May 1988, the District unilaterally 
subcontracted out certain unit work. The District's cross-
exceptions challenge the finding of violation of the Act and 
the scope of the remedial relief recommended as overly broad, 
while CSEA's exceptions challenge the scope of remedial 
relief recommended as unduly narrow. 
Board - U-10296 
-2 
Additionally, following the filing of the District's 
cross-exceptions, CSEA filed before this Board a motion to 
amend its improper practice charge to allege continuing 
subcontracting since May 1988. The motion is opposed by the 
District. 
FACTS 
The record before the ALJ in this matter consists of 
CSEA's charge, the District's answer, the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement, and a five-paragraph stipulation of 
fact. The charge alleges, in essence, that on or about 
May 25, 1988,-3=/ the District "contracted out work that has 
been historically and exclusively the work performed" by 
bargaining unit members, in that the District "had an outside 
contractor open one or more buildings for a Memorial Day 
Parade," in violation of §§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Act.-2-/ 
The District's answer denies the material allegations of 
the charge, except admits "that on or about May 28, 1988, the 
District assigned an individual other than a member of the 
bargaining unit represented by the charging party to unlock 
and lock a District building." The District's answer also 
•3=/Although the charge alleges an occurrence of May 28, 
1988, the stipulation of the parties discloses that the date 
in issue was in fact May 25, 1988. 
2/ 
The ALJ dismissed so much of the charge as alleges that 
the unilateral contracting out of bargaining unit work 
establishes coercion of unit members in the exercise of their 
rights under §209-a.l(a) of the Act. The dismissal of that 
portion of the charge is not the subject of exceptions before 
us, and we accordingly do not address it here. 
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asserts, as an affirmative defense, that the subject raised 
by the improper practice charge is a matter covered by the 
parties1 collective bargaining agreement, that deferral to 
arbitration is accordingly appropriate, and that the charge 
should be dismissed. 
The stipulation of fact submitted by the parties 
provides, in its entirety, as follows: 
1. The CSEA is the exclusive bargaining 
representative for those employed by the 
District as Chief Custodians and Head 
Custodians. 
2. That the bargaining unit has been in 
existence for approximately 2 0 years. 
3. For the past 20 years, Head and Chief 
Custodians were called in on holidays and 
on days off to open the buildings for 
such purposes as parades, football games, 
etc., and would receive extra or overtime 
pay in instances where they were called 
in to open the buildings. 
4. The opening of the buildings in the above 
instances was work performed exclusively 
by members of the Head and Chief 
Custodial Unit. 
5. On May 25, 1988, the District used a 
private security agency, the L & M 
Security of Long Island to come in and 
open the school buildings being used for 
participants in the Memorial Day parade. 
The final piece of record evidence before the ALJ 
consists of the collective bargaining agreement, executed by 
the parties for the period "July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1990." 
The District asserts that Clause 97 thereof establishes a 
waiver by CSEA of the right to negotiate concerning 
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subcontracting, or that this Board should defer to 
arbitration or that the Board is without jurisdiction to 
entertain CSEA's charge pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act. 3/ 
Clause 97 provides as follows: 
Work Rules 
97. The District reserves the right to promulgate 
and enforce work rules related to the employees * 
working relationship with the District, provided 
such work rules do not conflict with a specific 
provision of this agreement. 
The Association agrees that the District shall 
have the right to alter any "terms and conditions 
of employment" not specifically covered herein 
after prior notification and discussion with the 
Association. 
The Employer agrees that the provisions of 
this agreement shall supersede any work rules which 
may be in conflict with this agreement. 
The ALJ determined that the District failed to meet its 
burden of establishing that CSEA, by its agreement to 
Clause 97, waived the right to negotiate the loss of unit 
work. The ALJ further held that deferral to arbitration was 
not appropriate because, having found that the clause does 
not cover the subject of the charge, and that the right 
asserted by CSEA is based solely upon its rights under the 
Act, and because CSEA had not filed a grievance, no purpose 
would be achieved by such deferral. The ALJ accordingly 
•2/section 205.5(d) provides, in relevant part, that "the 
board shall not have authority to enforce an agreement 
between an employer and an employee organization and shall 
not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such 
an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an improper 
employer or employee organization practice." 
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found a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act by virtue of the 
District's subcontracting of unit work without negotiation 
with CSEA. 
With respect to the issue of remedial relief, the ALJ 
recommended the following: 
1. Cease and desist from assigning to 
nonunit personnel the duties of the Head 
and Chief custodian, as performed up to 
May 25, 1988; 
2. Make unit employees whole for any lost 
wages owing to the performance of unit 
work by L & M Security of Long Island, 
with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the CSEA 
concerning unit members' terms and 
conditions of employment; and 
4. Sign and post the attached Notice at all 
locations customarily used to post 
notices to unit members. 
The District excepts to the breadth of paragraphs 1 and 
3 of the recommended order, while CSEA excepts to the 
assertedly narrow scope of paragraph 2 of the recommended 
order. 
We will address first the parties• arguments relating to 
the violation found, and will then turn to their exceptions 
relating to the appropriateness of the relief recommended, as 
well as CSEA's motion to amend the charge. 
VIOLATION FOUND 
As the ALJ correctly points out in her decision, a 
violation of §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act is here made out unless 
the District is correct in its position that either CSEA has 
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waived its right to negotiate the subject matter, or it has 
in fact negotiated the subject matter and the scope and 
extent of CSEA's rights with respect to subcontracting are 
defined by Clause 97 of the collective bargaining agreement, 
in which case the Board would be without jurisdiction over 
the charge. 
There is no doubt that the District bears the burden of 
proving its affirmative defense^/ and that its burden of 
establishing a waiver by CSEA of the right to negotiate the 
loss of unit work must be met by proof that the waiver was 
knowing, unmistakable, and unambiguous. 5/ To the extent that 
the District argues that Clause 97 constitutes a waiver of 
CSEA's right to negotiate terms and conditions of employment 
not specifically covered by the agreement and substitutes 
therefor prior notification and discussion, it must establish 
that the paragraph applies to more than the section in which 
it appears and which is entitled "Work Rules". In other 
words, the District has the burden of proving that CSEA 
clearly and unmistakably agreed to confer upon the District 
the right to alter any and all terms and conditions of 
employment not specifically covered by the collective 
Vsee, e.g. , NYC Transit Authority, 20 PERB J[3037 
(1987), conf'd sub nom. NYC Transit Authority v. PERB, 
147 A.D.2d 574 and 156 A.D.2d 689, 22 PERB 57001 (2d Dep't 1989). 
Vsee CSEA v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB f7011 (3d 
Dep't 1982), aff'd. 61 N.Y.2d 1001, 17 PERB f7007 (1984). 
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bargaining agreement, and not merely those relating to "work 
rules", when it agreed to the work rules clause. 
The ALJ found that the relied-upon second sentence of 
Clause 97, placed as it is between two sentences specifically 
relating to work rules, fails to establish such a clear, 
unambiguous and unmistakable waiver of the right to negotiate 
all noncovered terms and conditions of employment, including 
subcontracting of unit work, which does not fall within the 
rubric of "work rules" as the term is commonly understood. 
In the absence of affirmative evidence that CSEA's agreement 
to the second sentence of Clause 97 was clearly intended by 
both parties to apply to more than work rules, the ALJ 
finding is in conformity with this Board's decision in Sachem 
Central School District, 21 PERB 53021 (1988) . In that case, 
we held broad contract language to constitute a waiver of the 
right to negotiate assignment of teaching duties to guidance 
counselors, where the language clearly and explicitly waived, 
without limitation, the right to negotiations concerning 
terms and conditions of employment. 
6/ 
£/The at-issue language in Sachem CSD, supra, provided as 
follows: 
All terms and conditions of employment not covered 
by this agreement shall continue to be subject to 
the Board's direction and control and shall not be 
the subject of negotiations until the commencement 
of the negotiations for a successor to this 
agreement. 
See also Bd. of Ed. of the CSD of the City of New York, 
8 PERB 53011 (1975). 
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We affirm the ALJ's finding that the affirmative defense 
of waiver has not been established here, because a 
substantial ambiguity exists concerning the scope and purpose 
of Clause 97 (Work Rules). In so finding, we note that in 
proceedings before the ALJ (although not before us), the 
District contended on one hand that Clause 97 applies as a 
waiver concerning all matters (including subcontracting) not 
covered by the agreement, and on the other hand that other 
clauses of the agreement cover the issue. Thus, the 
applicability of Clause 97 to the issue of subcontracting is 
less than clear even from the District's standpoint. 
The District further contends that this Board is without 
jurisdiction over the instant charge by virtue of §205.5(d) 
of the Act. However, having concluded that the District has 
failed to meet its burden of proving that the collective 
bargaining agreement covers the issue of subcontracting, it 
follows that the charge is not appropriately construed as one 
seeking enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement or 
one which would require the exercise of jurisdiction over an 
alleged violation of the agreement. This portion of the 
District's exception is accordingly also denied. 
Finally, we affirm the ALJ determination that deferral 
to arbitration is not appropriate under the circumstances of 
this case, since contractual coverage of the subcontracting 
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issue has not been established and since there is no pending 
grievance to which we could defer in any event.-2/ 
MOTION TO AMEND CHARGE 
On or about May 31, 1990, apparently following its 
receipt of the District's cross-exceptions and response to 
CSEA's exceptions, CSEA filed a motion for leave to amend its 
charge to allege that, in addition to the subcontracting 
alleged to have occurred on or about May 25, 1988 in 
connection with a Memorial Day parade, the District 
continually, from that date until March 30, 1990, "violated 
the Act by unilaterally subcontracting and removing 
bargaining unit work that prior to May 25, 1988 had 
previously been exclusively performed by the bargaining unit 
employees represented by the Charging Party." In its motion 
papers, but not in its proposed amended charge, CSEA alleges 
specifically that the District: 
Has continued to assign bargaining unit 
work specifically, the task of the 
opening of school buildings on holidays 
and/or days off for such purposes as 
parades, football games, etc. to the 
security guard agency and other nonunit 
employees,, continuing from on or about 
May 25, 1988 to March 20, 1990, the date 
that the Administrative Law Judge ordered 
the employer to restore the tasks to the 
bargaining unit employees. 
^/compare Herkimer County BOCES, 20 PERB f3050 (1987), 
wherein deferral of the determination concerning the Board * s 
jurisdiction was found appropriate pending the outcome of a 
grievance which was filed. See also Elmira Heights 
CSD, 21 PERB ?[3031 (1988). 
Board 
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Thus, CSEA now alleges that in addition to the violation 
of May 25, 1988, violations of the Act occurred on numerous 
unspecified occasions, by use of a security guard agency 
(perhaps intended to refer to L & M Security, which is the 
subject of the May 25 allegation) and other unidentified 
nonunit employees for unit work. At the outset, we note that 
the proposed amendment lacks particularity, as required by 
§204.1(b) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). More 
significant is the fact that the allegations in the proposed 
amendment make it untimely on its face, unless the amendment 
properly relates back to the original filing date. Relation 
back of a proposed amendment is appropriate only if 
procedural and due process requirements are met. However, 
the proposed amendment is presented to us, without 
explanation therefor, rather than to the ALJ when due process 
considerations could have been addressed. Indeed, the 
prejudice to the District in permitting the filing of such an 
amended charge would be substantial, since it is clear that 
the record in this matter was established upon the 
understanding of both parties that their litigation involved 
a single incident of alleged contracting out on May 25, 1988. 
•^Section 2 04.1(d) Rules provides, in pertinent part: 
The director or administrative law judge 
designated by the director may permit a 
charging party to amend the charge 
before, during or after the conclusion of 
the hearing upon such terms as may be 
deemed just and consistent with due 
process. 
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CSEA argues that it is entitled to broad remedial relief 
which would encompass contracting out occurring following the 
May 25, 1988 incident. However, a determination of the 
appropriate scope of the relief must, of necessity, rest upon 
the scope of the violation alleged and proven and CSEA may 
not now come before us and allege the existence of numerous 
other and continuing bases for violations in an effort to 
broaden the remedial relief appropriate to the original 
charge. The motion for leave to file an amended charge is 
denied. 
SCOPE OF REMEDIAL RELIEF 
The District argues, in its cross-exceptions, that the 
first paragraph of the remedial relief recommended by the ALJ 
is unduly broad, because it directs the District to "cease 
and desist from assigning to nonunit personnel the duties of 
the head and chief custodian . . . " (emphasis added). The 
District contends that the phrase "L & M Security" should be 
substituted for the phrase "nonunit personnel" in order to 
properly apply the scope of remedial relief to the facts of 
the case. While we agree that the scope of the cease and 
desist order should closely relate to the violation found, we 
nevertheless find that it is appropriate to refer generally 
to nonunit personnel rather than to the particular contractor 
involved in the incident of May 25, 1988, because prospective 
relief in the nature of a cease and desist order keys to the 
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nature of the violation found, rather than to the particular 
entities or persons involved in the violation, and is 
therefore appropriately broader in scope.^J Because the 
scope of the remedial relief recommended by the AKT is before 
us in its entirety, however, we determine that the cease and 
desist order should be limited to the assignment of duties 
found to have violated the Act, rather than to all of the 
duties of the head and chief custodians. Accordingly, we 
will modify so much of paragraph 1 of our Order as to refer 
to the duty "to open District buildings on holidays and days 
off." By this modification, we focus not upon the 
particular entity to whom the unit work was assigned (as 
proposed by the District), but upon the nature of the work 
assigned for purposes of assuring prospective compliance with 
the Act in the manner in which it has been found to have been 
violated. By doing so, unnecessary future litigation of the 
same issue may be avoided. 
Conversely, CSEA contends that paragraph 2 of the ALJ's 
recommended remedial order is unduly narrow, because it 
limits backpay relief to persons adversely affected by the 
•2/For example, were the District to contract with "M & L 
Security" rather than "L & M Security" for the same unit 
work, it would be inappropriate to compel CSEA to file and 
prove a new charge, rather than obtain enforcement of the 
order issued on the basis of the charge already litigated. 
It is the act of contracting out the work determined to be 
exclusively unit work which is significant; the identity of 
the nonunit personnel to whom it is assigned is not 
significant for purposes of prospective relief. 
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subcontracting to L & M Security only, and not to other 
nonunit personnel who may have performed unit work. We adopt 
the recommendation of the ALT in this regard because the 
District's backpay liability is appropriately limited to the 
consequences of the particular violation found. In the 
instant case, the proof is limited to contracting out of 
building opening service to L & M Security and not to other 
persons or entities. The policy considerations supporting 
our determination that prospective relief is appropriately 
somewhat broad in scope do not apply to retroactive relief, 
which must be firmly founded in the violation alleged and 
proven. CSEA, by this exception, in fact seeks to achieve 
through very broad remedial relief that which it cannot now 
achieve, i.e., relief for other violations of the Act not 
timely alleged and proven.-iQ/ The exception is denied. 
The third paragraph of the ALJ's recommended order is 
also the subject of cross-exceptions by the District. The 
District alleges, in this regard, that the language of the 
third paragraph is unduly broad, and should have been limited 
to the contractual requirement of notification and discussion 
contained in Clause 97 of the parties* agreement. For 
reasons outlined infra, we have determined that Clause 97 has 
iWSee County of Broome, 22 PERB ?[3019 (1989) , for 
discussion concerning the fact that while proof of 
entitlement to a particular remedy is not required, the 
remedy should be, and typically is, apparent from the 
violation found. 
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not been established to apply to the subcontracting in the 
instant case, and, having so found, it would be inappropriate 
for us to refer back to that clause or to fashion remedial 
relief based upon it. Had we found that CSEA waived its 
right to negotiate by accepting instead a contractual right 
to notice and discussion, we would have dismissed the charge 
on its merits and no remedial relief would have been 
appropriate. The District's exception in this regard is 
denied. 
The language of paragraph 3 of the remedial order having 
been placed in issue before us, we have considered it in 
detail and determine that the "cease and desist" language 
contained in paragraph 1 of the remedial relief affords 
appropriate prospective make-whole relief. In view of the 
fact that the imposition by remedial order of a general duty 
to negotiate in good faith is not required since it, in 
essence, does nothing more than reiterate the obligation 
found in §209-a.l(d) of the Act, deletion of paragraph 3 of 
the recommended remedial order is appropriate. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from assigning to nonunit 
personnel the duties of the head and chief 
custodians to open District buildings on holidays 
and days off, as performed up to May 25, 1988; 
2. Make unit employees whole for any lost wages owing 
to the performance of unit work by L & M Security 
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of Long Island, on May 25, 1988, with interest at 
the maximum legal rate; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit members. 
DATED: October 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
iarold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membezl 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 a l l e m p l o y e e s in the unit represented by the Middle 
Country Central School District.Chief & Head Supervisory Unit of 
Suffolk Educational Local 87.0, Local 1000, CSEA/AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
that the Middle Country Central School District: 
Will not assign to nonunit personnel the 
duties of the head and chief custodians 
to open District buildings on holidays 
and days off, as performed up to May 25, 
1988; 
Will make unit employees whole for any 
lost wages owing to the performance of 
unit work by L & M Security of Long 
Island, on May 25, 1988, with interest 
at the maximum legal rate. 
Middle Country Central School District 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altere-
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
//2D-10/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11211 
PIPE CAULKERS AND REPAIRMEN'S LOCAL 
NO. 18029, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
DAMON AND MOREY, ESQS. (MELINDA G. DISARE, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Charging Party 
SARGENT, REPKA AND PINO, P.C., (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The City of Buffalo (City) has filed exceptions to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) decision which finds that the 
Pipe Caulkers and Repairmen's Local No. 18029, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (Local) violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it submitted to fact-finding 
certain demands found to be nonmandatory, but which dismissed 
the charge in other respects. In particular, the City 
excepts to ALT findings that a demand entitled "Reserve 
Notification" is a mandatory subject of negotiation, and that 
the City failed to meet its burden of proving that four 
articles contained in the parties' expired agreement (alleged 
by the City to be nonmandatory subjects of negotiation) were 
submitted to fact-finding in violation of the Act. The City 
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also excepts to the ALJ decision on procedural grounds, 
because the decision was issued before the City received a 
copy of the Local's brief to the ALJ. We will address the 
procedural exception first, and then address the substantive 
exceptions. 
PROCEDURAL EXCEPTION 
By letter dated March 21, 1990, both parties were 
directed by the assigned ALJ to submit briefs, if any, with 
proof of service upon the other party, on or before April 20, 
1990. Apparently, the Local's counsel timely forwarded the 
appropriate number of copies of its brief to the ALJ, but, 
instead of submitting proof of service of an additional copy 
upon opposing counsel, forwarded the additional copy to the 
ALJ for the purpose of having the ALJ forward the additional 
copy to opposing counsel. Thereafter, on April 24, 1990, 
upon receipt of a complaint from the City *s counsel that it 
had not received a copy of the Local's brief, the ALJ 
directed the Local's counsel to forward a copy of its brief 
to the City's counsel. 
Apparently assuming that the Local's counsel had 
complied with his directive, the ALJ issued a decision on 
May 7, 1990. 
The City is completely correct in its assertion that it 
was entitled to receive from the Local's counsel a copy of 
the Local's brief, and that the Local had an obligation under 
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§204.8 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) to accompany the 
brief submitted to the ALJ with proof of service of a copy 
thereof upon the City. This the Local clearly did not do. 
However, notwithstanding the Local's failure to comply with 
our Rules of Procedure in this regard, the City has 
established no prejudice to it in the failure to obtain a 
copy of the Local's brief before the ALT decision was issued. 
No representation is made to us that the City would have 
requested the opportunity to file a reply brief to the ALJ in 
response to the Local's brief, nor is any claim made that the 
Local's brief contained material which should not have been 
considered by the ALJ, and would not have been if the City 
had had the opportunity to timely object to it. Furthermore, 
the ALJ's directive to the parties to simultaneously file 
briefs establishes that the City was not automatically to be 
accorded the opportunity to review the Local's brief before 
submitting its own. Because no prejudice to the City has 
been shown, the Local's violation of our Rules of Procedure 
under the specific circumstances of this case is not an 
adequate basis for setting aside the ALJ decision. 
However, the importance of compliance with our Rules of 
Procedure, particularly those relating to the provision of 
immediate access to all parties of any communication to any 
party or the ALJ, cannot be overstated. Although the 
exception in this instance is denied, the Board reminds this 
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Local and, indeed, all other parties appearing before the 
Board, that our Rules of Procedure should be carefully 
reviewed to assure full compliance therewith. 
EXCEPTION NO. 1 
The City excepts, on substantive grounds, to the portion 
of the ALJ decision which finds the following language to 
constitute a mandatory subject of negotiation: 
4. Reserve Notification. 
Article 111.2(D) Second Paragraph - make 
new second sentence to read: "Employees 
on reserve shift who cannot work overtime 
beyond their reserve shift shall notify 
their immediate supervisor at the 
beginning of their reserve shift." 
Reviewing this language in the context of other language 
contained in the expired agreement at Article III.2 thereof, 
the ALJ determined that the demand constitutes nothing more 
than "a reasonable notification as to unavailability for work 
beyond that otherwise scheduled". In its exceptions, the 
City asserts that the demand is intended to assert a right to 
refuse overtime merely by the giving of advance notification. 
For the reasons which follow, while we agree with the City's 
characterization of the demand, we nevertheless affirm the 
ALJ's decision that the demand is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
In the first instance, if the demand were nothing more 
than a demand for advance notification of unavailability for 
overtime work, and not a demand for the right to refuse 
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overtime work, one would expect that the demand would be an 
employer rather than an employee organization demand. 
However, it is unnecessary for us to speculate about why an 
employee organization would seek to negotiate imposition of 
an advance notification requirement upon its members, 
because, in its brief to us in response to the City's 
exceptions, the Local readily acknowledges the purpose and 
intent of its demand, stating: 
[U]nder the current Article III, 3-2(D), 
employees who are on "regular shifts" have the 
option of refusing to work overtime. The 
above [reserve notification] proposal would 
also permit employees who work the "reserve 
shift" to refuse to work overtime. 
Thus, the City and the Local are in accord concerning their 
understanding that the reserve notification demand 
constitutes an assertion of the right to refuse overtime 
based upon the giving of advance notification thereof. As 
such, it constitutes a demand which seeks to limit the hours 
of work of specified employees at their option. The City 
argues that such a demand might potentially impact upon its 
ability to obtain adequate coverage in an emergency 
situation, and that the demand should therefore be held 
nonmandatory. However, the City's concern is not based upon 
any record evidence and is speculative at best. Furthermore, 
as is made clear at §204.3 of the Act, the duty to negotiate 
collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession." We hold 
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that the instant demand relates to hours of work and is 
accordingly a mandatory subject of negotiation pursuant to 
§2 01.4 of the Act.-!/ in doing so, we are cognizant of the 
holdings of this Board which have held decisions concerning 
the level of services to be provided and number of persons 
required to be on duty to be management prerogatives and 
therefore not mandatorily negotiable. See, for example, City 
School District of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB J[3060 
(1971), City of White Plains. 5 PERB K3008 (1972), Town of 
Blooming Grove, 21 PERB J[3032 (1988) . However, we do not 
construe the management prerogative there found of 
determining the number of persons necessary to perform the 
employer's mission to preclude a duty to negotiate concerning 
the number of hours which employees may be required to work 
in furtherance of that mission. In the instant case, there 
is no showing that a demand to limit the number of hours to 
be required of an employee necessarily precludes the City 
from carrying out its mission, nor is the City prevented from 
presenting counterproposals which would address its concerns 
•^/section 2 01.4 Act provides: 
The term 'terms and conditions of 
employment' means salaries, wages, hours, 
agency shop fee deduction and other terms 
and conditions of employment . . . . 
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in this regard.-2/ 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALT determination that the 
Local's reserve notification demand is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation is affirmed. 
EXCEPTION NO. 2 
The City *s second exception asserts that the ALJ erred 
in failing to find that the Local improperly insisted upon 
the continuation of assertedly nonmandatory provisions of the 
parties' expired collective bargaining agreement. 
The ALJ found, and we agree, that there is no record 
evidence that the Local affirmatively submitted to fact-
finding or insisted upon negotiation at the fact-finding 
stage concerning four provisions of the expired agreement 
which the City contends are nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation. Instead, the City asserts that the Local's 
violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Act lies in its failure to 
acknowledge, upon the City's demand, that it has abandoned 
the four at-issue provisions and/or does not seek their 
continuation. 
As we held in Village of Mamaroneck PBA, 22 PERB f3029 
(1989), we will not find a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act in the absence of evidence that an employee organization 
•2-/While, in reaching this conclusion, it is unnecessary for 
us to address the context in which the demand language is 
proposed to be added to the language in the parties* expired 
agreement, we note that other language of Article III.2 
appears to address assurance of coverage in emergency situations. 
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is pursuing to interest arbitration, or is insisting upon 
negotiating, nonmandatory subjects of bargaining. This is so 
even where the employee organization makes plain its legal 
opinion that terms of the parties1 expired agreement, 
including nonmandatory terms, may continue by operation of 
law. See also Dobbs Ferry Police Association, Inc.. 22 PERB 
H3039 (1989), where this Board held that an employee 
organization which in fact sought to obtain an interest 
arbitration award which would include provisions of the 
expired agreement asserted by the employer and found by us to 
be nonmandatory did violate §209-a.2(b) of the Act. See also 
City of Buffalo, 23 PERB J[3036 (1990) . 
The burden of proving a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act rests with the City, as the charging party. In order to 
meet this burden, the City must establish that the Local has 
insisted upon continued negotiations or has submitted to 
fact-finding nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, whether 
those nonmandatory subjects constitute new demands or seek 
continuation of language in an expired agreement. By 
asserting that the Local has violated the Act by its failure 
to affirmatively deny insistence upon negotiation or 
submission to fact-finding of nonmandatory subjects, the City 
seeks to shift the burden of proof to the Local to establish 
no violation. We decline to adopt the City's argument in 
this regard, and deny the exception accordingly. 
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Finally, we address the City's assertion in support of 
its claim of improper insistence in which it charges that by 
referencing provisions in the parties* expired agreement as 
part of affirmative demands submitted to fact-finding, the 
Local has also submitted the referenced provisions to fact-
finding. 2/ As we held in City of Buffalo, supra, at 3073 
(1990): 
Because there is no evidence whatsoever 
that the Association has included in its 
petition for interest arbitration 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation over 
the objection of the City, the instant 
charge must be dismissed. This is so 
even though the petition contains some 
demands, not at issue before us, which 
purport to 'amend' articles of the 
parties' expired agreement in specified 
respects. The fact that the Association 
contends that items in the expired 
agreement continue in effect following 
issuance of the interest arbitration 
award unless modified by the award has no 
bearing upon our disposition of a charge 
by the City alleging that nonmandatory 
subjects have been submitted, over its 
objection, to interest arbitration, 
because our review is limited to those 
matters actually placed before the 
arbitration panel, [footnote omitted] 
The holding in City of Buffalo is equally applicable to 
the exceptions before us only the "Reserve 
Notification" demand refers to the expired agreement. That 
demand is separately cognizable without reference to the 
language of the expired agreement. A different result might 
apply, however, to a demand insisted upon at fact-finding 
which has no meaning except in the context of nonmandatory 
language in the expired agreement. 
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the instant charge, insofar as it asserts that reference to 
provisions of the expired agreement in negotiating proposals 
constitutes submission of the referenced articles of the 
expired agreement to fact-finding. As we rejected that 
argument with respect to submissions to interest arbitration, 
we reject it with respect to submissions to fact-finding. 
Based upon the foregoing, the City's exceptions are 
denied, and the ALJ decision is affirmed for the reasons set 
forth herein. 
DATED: October 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
' Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
UJLMC~,Y~ £++ 
Walter L. E i s enbe rg , Memb 
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N STATE OF NEW YORK 
J PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 




FULTON COUNTY NURSES UNIT, CSEA, INC., 
LOCAL 818, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Fulton County Nurses Unit, 
CSEA, Inc., Local 818 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Registered Nurses, Public Health Nurses, 
Excluded: Elected officials and all other county 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Fulton County Nurses Unit, 
CSEA, Inc., Local 818. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: October 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membc 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FULTON COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3707 
COUNTY OF FULTON and the FULTON COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
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Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Fulton County Deputy 
Sheriff's Benevolent Association, Inc. has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
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below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the Fulton County Sheriff's 
Department, 
Excluded: The Sheriff and the Undersheriff. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Fulton County Deputy 
Sheriff's Benevolent Association, Inc. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: October 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
l£*r-h«~£t><^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
#3010/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FOOD SERVICE WORKERS OF BAY SHORE, 
NYSUT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3702 
BAY SHORE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Food Service Workers 
of Bay Shore, NYSUT has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees in the following titles who work 
more than 15 hours per week: cashier, cook, 
food server, food service worker, 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Food Service Workers 
of Bay Shore, NYSUT. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written. 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 22, 1990 
Albany, New York 
#3D-10/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF MARLBOROUGH POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3686 
TOWN OF MARLBOROUGH, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Marlborough 
Policemen's Benevolent Association has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
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below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time police officers, 
Excluded: Chief of Police. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Marlborough 
Policemen's Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: October 22, 199 0 
Albany, New York 
fe^jr^^a-t^/ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memfce er 
#5A-10/22/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
CERTIFICATION 
I, Harold R. Newman, Chairman of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, hereby certify that, by the unanimous vote 
of the Board members present at a meeting held in Albany, New 
York, on October 22, 1990, the attached amendments to Parts 
201, 203, 204, 205, 206 and 207 of Title 4 of the Official 
Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of 
New York were duly adopted pursuant to Executive Order Number 
131 and the authority vested in the Board by Article 14, 
Section 205.5(1) of the Civil Service Law. 
There were no substantive changes in the rules and these 
amendments are effective upon publication of this notice in 
the State Register. 
A notice of proposed agency action was published in the 
State Register on August 8, 1990. No other prior notice of 
this action was required by statute. 
October 22, 1990 
Dated 
~y Harold R. Newm< man 
Chairman 
^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
Public Employment Relations Board 
Text of New Rules: 
1. Section 201.2(d) is hereby amended to read as follows: 
201.2(d). Ob i ection. A party who objects to the processing of a 
petition on the ground that it was filed earlier than the times 
provided for filing under section 201.3 of this Part [may file an 
original and four copies of such objection, with proof of service upon 
all other parties within 10 working days after receipt from the 
director of a copy of the petition. The objection] shall include a 
specific, detailed statement of why the petition is untimely in its 
response filed in accordance with section 201.5(d) of this Part. Such 
objection to the processing of the petition, if not duly raised, may be 
"N, deemed waived. 
2. Section 201.3(d) is hereby amended to read as follows: 
201.3(d). A petition for certification or decertification may be 
filed [within 30 days] during the month before the expiration, under 
section 208.2 of the act, of the period of unchallenged representation 
status accorded a recognized or certified employee organization. 
Unless filed by a public employer, such a petition shall be supported 
by a showing of interest of at least 30 percent of the employees in the 
unit already in existence or alleged to be appropriate by the 
petitioner. 
3. The title to section 201.5 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
201.5 Contents of petition for certification; contents of 
petition for decertification; contents of petition to clarify existing 
unit or to determine unit placement of new or substantially altered 
pos itions: response to petition. 
4. A new subdivision (d) is hereby added to section 201.5 to read 
as follows: 
201.5(d). Response. Except for the petitioner, all parties shall 
file with the director within 10 working days after receipt of a copy 
of the petition from the director, an original and four copies of a 
response to the petition containing a signed declaration of its 
truthfulness by an identified representative of the responding party, 
with proof of service of a copy thereof upon all other parties. The 
response shall include a specific admission, denial or explanation of 
each allegation made by the petitioner, a description of the unit 
claimed to be appropriate by the responding party for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and a clear and concise statement of any other 
facts which the responding party claims may bear on the petition. 
5. Paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of section 201.9 is hereby 
renumbered to paragraph (4) of subdivision (c) of section 201.9. 
6. A new paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of section 201.9 is 
hereby added to read as follows: 
201.9(c)(3). Motion for recusal. Any party to a proceeding may 
move that the administrative law judge assigned to that proceeding 
recuse himself/herself from further participation in that proceeding. 
Except upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances, a motion for 
recusal shall be made as soon as reasonably possible after the basis 
for such motion becomes known to the party making it. Unless made at a 
hearing, such motion shall be made in writing to the administrative law 
judge, shall set forth all of the known grounds for the motion and 
shall be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof upon all 
other parties and the director. Unless such motion is made at a 
hearing, any party may file with the administrative law judge a 
response to such motion within three working days of its receipt of a 
copy thereof, with proof of service of a copy of the response on all 
other parties and the director, unless otherwise directed by the 
administrative law judge. Motions for recusal made at a hearing, and 
responses thereto, shall be made upon such terms as the administrative 
law judge shall direct. The administrative law judge's ruling on the 
motion shall be made either in writing or on the record at the hearing 
and the ruling, the recusal motion and any response shall be part of 
the record of the proceeding. 
7. Subdivision (i) of section 201.10 is hereby repealed. 
8. Subdivisions (e), (f), (g) and (h) of section 201.10 are 
hereby renumbered to subdivision (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section 
201.10. 
9. A new subdivision (e) of section 201.10 is hereby added to 
read as follows: 
201.10(e). Response. The parties, as defined by section 
201.10(a)(2) of this Part, except the applicant, shall file with the 
director within 10 working days after receipt of a copy of the 
application from the director, an original and four copies of a 
response to the application containing a signed declaration of its 
truthfulness by an identified representative of the responding party, 
with proof of service of a copy thereof upon all other parties. The 
response shall include a specific admission, denial or explanation of 
each allegation made by the applicant and a clear and concise statement 
of any other facts which may bear on the application. If a responding 
party objects to the processing of an application on the ground that it 
was filed earlier than the time provided under section 201.10(b) of 
this Part, the response shall include a specific, detailed statement of 
why the application is untimely. Such objection to the processing of 
the application, if not duly raised, may be deemed waived. 
10. Subdivision (h) of section 201.12 is hereby amended to read 
as follows: 
201.12(h). The Board shall [may] designate an employee 
organization as the exclusive representative of public employees within 
a negotiating unit if the employee organization has demonstrated that 
it has majority status among [represents a majority of] the employees 
within the negotiating unitj. [and there has been prior agreement 
between the public employer and such employee organization that such 
organization should be accorded exclusive rights of representation.] 
11. Subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (3) of subdivision (g) of 
section 203.8 is renumbered to subparagraph (iv) of paragraph (3) of 
subdivision (g) of section 203.8. 
12. A new sub-paragraph of paragraph (iii) of paragraph (3) of 
subdivision (g) of section 203.8 is hereby added to read as follows: 
203.8(g)(3)(iii). Motion for recusal. Any party to a proceeding 
may move that the administrative law judge assigned to that proceeding 
recuse himself/herself from further participation in that proceeding. 
Except upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances, a motion for 
recusal shall be made as soon as reasonably possible after the basis 
for such motion becomes known to the party making it. Unless made at a 
hearing, such motion shall be made in writing to the administrative law 
judge, shall set forth all of the known grounds for the motion and 
shall be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof upon all 
other parties and the director. Unless such motion is made at a 
hearing, any party may file with the administrative law judge a 
response to such motion within three working days of its receipt of a 
copy thereof, with proof of service of a copy of the response on all 
other parties and the director, unless otherwise directed by the 
administrative law judge. Motions for recusal made at a hearing, and 
responses thereto, shall be made upon such terms as the administrative 
law judge shall direct. The administrative law judge's ruling on the 
motion shall be made either in writing or on the record at the hearing 
and the ruling, the recusal motion and any response shall be part of 
the record of the proceeding. 
13. Subdivision (h) of section 204.7 is hereby renumbered to 
paragraph (2) of subdivision (h) of section 204.7. 
14. A new paragraph (1) of subdivision (h) of section 204.7 is 
hereby added to read as follows: 
204.7(h)(1). Any party to a proceeding may move that the 
administrative law judge assigned to that proceeding recuse 
himself/herself from further participation in that proceeding. Except 
upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances, a motion for recusal 
shall be made as soon as reasonably possible after the basis for such 
motion becomes known to the party making it. Unless made at a hearing, 
such motion shall be made in writing to the administrative law judge, 
shall set forth all of the known grounds for the motion and shall be 
accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof upon all other 
parties and the director. Unless such motion is made at a hearing, any 
party may file with the administrative law judge a response to such 
motion within three working days of its receipt of a copy thereof, with 
proof of service of a copy of the response on all other parties and the 
director, unless otherwise directed by the administrative law judge. 
Motions for recusal made at a hearing, and responses thereto, shall be 
made upon such terms as the administrative law judge shall direct. The 
administrative law judge's ruling on the motion shall be made either in 
writing or on the record at the hearing and the ruling, the recusal 
motion and any response shall be part of the record of the proceeding. 
15. Subdivision (a) of section 205.4 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
205.4(a). Filing. [A] An original and three copies of a petition 
requesting the board to refer an impasse to a public arbitration panel 
may be filed by an employee organization or public employer after 15 
days have elapsed following appointment by the board of a mediator to 
such impasse. [It shall] A copy of the petition shall also be served 
upon the other party to the impasse [immediately.] s imultaneously. 
16. Subdivision (a) of section 205.5 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
205.5(a). Filing. [A] An original and three copies of a response 
shall be filed within 10 working days of receipt of the petition 
requesting arbitration. [It shall] A copy of the response shall also 
be served upon the petitioning party simultaneously. 
17. Subdivision (b) of section 205.5 is hereby amended to read as 
follows: 
205.5(b). Contents. Such response shall contain respondent's 
position specifying the terms and conditions of employment that were 
resolved by agreement, and as to those that were not agreed upon, 
respondent shall set forth its position. Proposed contract language 
( 
may be attached. If the respondent has filed an improper practice 
charge related to compulsory interest arbitration under section 205.6 
of this Part, the response shall contain a reference to such charge. 
The response must include proof of service upon the petitioning party. 
18. Paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of section 206.6 is hereby 
renumbered to paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of section 206.6. 
19. A new paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of section 206.6 is 
hereby added to read as follows: 
206.6(c)(2). Motion for recusal. Any party to a proceeding may 
move that the administrative law judge assigned to that proceeding 
recuse himself/herself from further participation in that proceeding. 
Except upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances, a motion for 
recusal shall be made as soon as reasonably possible after the basis 
for such motion becomes known to the party making it. Unless made at a 
hearing, such motion shall be made in writing to the administrative law 
judge, shall set forth all of the known grounds for the motion and 
shall be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof upon all 
other parties and the director. "Unless such motion is made at a 
hearing, any party may file with the administrative law judge a 
response to such motion within three working days of its receipt of a 
copy thereof, with proof of service of a copy of the response on all 
other parties and the director, unless otherwise directed by the 
administrative law judge. Motions for recusal made at a hearing, and 
responses thereto, shall be made upon such terms as the administrative 
law judge shall direct. The administrative law judge's ruling on the 
motion shall be made either in writing or on the record at the hearing 
and the ruling, the recusal motion and any response shall be part of 
the record of the proceeding. 
20. Subdivision (a) of section 207.13 is hereby amended to read 
as follows: 
207.13(a). The award shall be in writing, signed and 
[acknowledged] affirmed by the arbitrator, and shall be delivered to 
the parties either personally or by registered or certified mail, 
return receipt requested. If no period of time for the rendition of an 
award has been specified in the agreement and the parties have not 
mutually agreed to an expedited rendition of the award, as provided in 
section 207.12 of this Part, an award shall be rendered within 30 days 
after the arbitrator has declared the hearing closed, unless this time 
period has been extended by the parties and so confirmed by them in 
writing. 
21. Subdivision (a) of section 207.15 is hereby amended to read 
as follows: 
207.15(a). [There is no administrative fee] An administrative fee 
of forty dollars per party shall be charged by the board for its 
administrative services. 
